This Next Steps programme explored why the UK’s flagship rail project was downsized – and what future projects should learn.
It’s almost a year since the northern leg of High Speed 2 was cancelled after 15 years of development.
The decision left a gap in the UK’s transport network.
It’s also weakened confidence in the country’s ability to deliver major infrastructure projects.
That’s something the government can’t afford with infrastructure being key to meeting so many of its objectives.
Learning lessons
In April, the ICE launched a Next Steps programme to understand how HS2 reached that point.
And, most importantly, what lessons policymakers and engineers should take from it.
I was asked to chair the steering group for the programme.
The aim is to help improve how major infrastructure projects are planned, promoted and delivered – not just in the UK, but around the world.
We‘ve spoken to key decision-makers on HS2, alongside other experts. This final briefing paper sets out what we’ve heard across five key lessons:
1. Who’s in charge of infrastructure projects must be clear
HS2 Ltd went through many different forms with high levels of staff turnover.
That’s normal on a project of this size. But without a coherent organisational model to enable continuity:
- corporate memory was lost
- it was unclear who was making decisions
- many roles were duplicated
This increased the sense that there was too little control over costs.
Oversight dilemma
Major public projects also need the right level, and the right type, of governmental oversight.
Too much leads to micromanagement and inefficiency. Too little and problems are ignored and decisions not scrutinised enough.
On HS2, there was a lack of technical design oversight to make sure what was being built was value for money.
2. Stronger client and departmental capability is needed – particularly on technical assurance and ‘owning the project’
Having government departments sponsor major projects works – but only if they are capable.
HS2 showed that civil servants and ministers often lack the right technical and delivery expertise.
Better training will help them understand the role they should play. More stability in appointments will help apply that knowledge.
Competing with the private sector for talent is difficult for the civil service. But government sponsors must prioritise recruitment rather than focusing on costs.
There was optimism that the expected creation of a new National Infrastructure and Service Transformation Authority (NISTA) could better support major infrastructure planning and delivery.
3. Any programme of this scale and significance needs more development time before commencing works
The most value can be achieved in a project’s conceptual stages. Clients have maximum control and costs are lowest.
On HS2, politics drove the project forward too quickly. But this left little time to assess alternative options, build in flexibility and challenge designs.
Instead, politicians’ preferences for world-leading specifications drove costs higher than necessary.
And too little attention was given to how the route would interact with other infrastructure to minimise disruption and maximise the wider benefits.
Saying how much the project would cost early on – with so little design work completed – was another key mistake for managing expectations later.
4. The contracting approach should set up the project up for best-practice delivery
The contracts were awarded too early on Phase 1. There had been too little design development or risk mitigation – particularly for such large contracts.
That size also gave the contractors more influence to change the terms.
Including design aspects in the contracts as well meant HS2 Ltd couldn’t act as the ‘guiding mind’ for the technical development of the project.
One consequence was the failure to use more standardised assets, such as bridges, to reduce costs.
5. Major projects and programmes require clarity and consistency on outcomes to achieve political and public buy-in and deliver value for money
One of the striking things about the decision to cancel the northern leg was that the prime minister alone could make it, despite the project having parliamentary approval.
In part, that was because political and public support had ebbed away.
There’s never been a consensus about why HS2 was needed and what benefits it would bring to maintain support amid rising costs.
Infrastructure planning needs to start with outcomes to find the right solutions. That in turn will change how we debate those projects.
Many of our conversations reiterated the need for a national transport strategy as a starting point, which the ICE has long called for.
HS2 had many benefits – but they were generally understated. Instead, the lack of a clear strategic case meant the debate defaulted to costs.
Lost opportunities
It’s important to stress that lessons were already being learned on HS2. We heard clearly that Phase 2 would avoid making the same mistakes.
New approaches to design, contracting and delivery as well as efficiency gains were expected to reduce costs.
Those likely benefits will be lost.
As has the chance to develop talent and capacity in the UK’s supply chain.
Instead, the project is being reset to focus on delivering Phase 1.
Why this matters
Since we launched this programme, the UK has had a change in government. But Labour won’t be reversing the decision to cancel the northern leg.
It hasn’t yet said how it will address connectivity and capacity challenges on the UK’s railways.
Whatever the new government decides, it’s important that it thinks long-term, is clear about the outcomes it wants to achieve and focuses on building capacity in the right areas.
The lessons from HS2 are not just important for transport.
For example, Labour has also set a target of decarbonising the electricity grid by 2030 – a huge engineering challenge.
But speeding up infrastructure delivery in all sectors is essential for the new government to deliver on its promises in the next five years.
