Without a change in mindset, the UK risks never completing a major infrastructure project, writes former HS2 minister Paul Maynard.
Interest in High Speed 2 (HS2) never seems to fade.
A Panorama report on the project’s troubled history, an Andy Burnham-commissioned proposal for a replacement line, and the ICE’s thoughtful analysis are just some examples of recent coverage.
What struck me looking at it all in full was the lack of consistency throughout the project. The trouble people had with the fundamental question: “What is HS2 for?”
The same should go for any transport project – define the strategic problem, then come up with the best infrastructure answer. But it never seems that simple.
It began with capacity
HS2’s story began relatively simply: we knew the West Coast Main Line would soon be at capacity.
New train paths were needed. Capacity was key. Speed was nice to have, but not crucial. Some said to build “best in class” on the basis of “why not?”. If you don’t ask, you don’t get.
Somewhere in the mix the gold-plating and the speed overtook capacity, and during my two stints as minister it seemed all but impossible to get us back on track.
‘A series of small decisions’
A series of small decisions, each rational within their own parameters, gradually drew the project away from addressing the capacity crunch.
Tunnelling. Serving Sheffield. What to do at Crewe. Rolling stock configuration. Review after review after review tinkered with the project.
Successive ministers and secretaries of state all approached matters from a slightly different angle, with differing levels of enthusiasm.
Where a minister should have played a role
The biggest decision in my view was specifying rolling stock that would never achieve the 400kph originally expected.
This was the big chance to reprofile the route to run alongside existing transport corridors, since there was no need for such a straight line.
This was especially viable when looking at Phases 2a and 2b – but the chance wasn’t taken.
This is where a minister like me could – indeed, should – have played a role.
Too late to think outside the box
Post-Oakervee, with a growing focus on cost, I felt it time to think outside the box and optimise the three main rail projects benefitting the north.
But by that point, Boris Johnson had asked me to ‘step aside’ from government.
Given the threat to HS2, I consistently asked myself and others the same question. How will we answer the West Coast Main Line’s challenges if we don’t have HS2?
The suggestions were far from compelling and the ‘bigger beasts’ had their minds firmly made up.
The scope for strategic thinking was limited
As minister, the scope to think outside the box was actually quite limited.
Strategic thinking tended to see some gazing into the distance.
My role seemed much more limited. Cheerleading for the project. Defending it in Parliament. Solving small problems on the route. Visiting bigger problems like the Shimmer Estate in Mexborough. Fretting over hedgehogs in the London Zoological Society’s car park.
What ministers like me needed was greater training on how to be responsible for major infrastructure projects.
It wasn’t for me to micro-manage, certainly. But it was necessary for me to get under the bonnet and better interpret the advice and guidance given to me.
I was clear about wider strategic issues – including how the economic development that justified the line would actually take place.
But procurement strategies, for example, weren’t something I’d come across before.
The original problem remains unaddressed
At the end of the day, with so much now lopped off the original vision, we’re still left with the basic problem of capacity on the West Coast Main Line. Perhaps even a worse problem than before.
It remains my view that a new line is needed, and that it can integrate with existing Trans-Pennine projects to reach Leeds without the complications of an eastern leg.
But that requires a refresh of the question. What are we seeking to achieve in transport, rather than in politics? A different answer might emerge.
How HS2 affects other projects
The HS2 experience has ramifications for the other projects in my former brief, which are somewhere still in the pipeline – even if ground to a halt.
East West Rail, rail access to Heathrow, Northern Powerhouse Rail, Crossrail 2. They all come round in circles.
But we’re seduced by their names, which gain a life of their own, rather than the problems they solve.
We forget to ask time and again whether the question – or the solution – may have changed.
If we don’t alter that mindset, we risk never starting, let alone completing, a major project in the future.
Paul Maynard is a former Conservative minister. He served as parliamentary under-secretary of state for transport from 2016–2018 and 2019–2020. Image credit for his portrait: UK Parliament (licensed under CC by 3.0).
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